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Russia-Ukraine Mini SITREP for 09 FEB 2023 15:15 PST - Quick Update
🕑 Added 2023-02-09 23:26:21 +0000 UTCWe're doing a lot of geolocation right now with a flood of videos and pictures that have been released on what we can confidently say is the end of day one of the wide-scale Russian offensive. Consider this a hot take versus definitive.
Luhansk: The situation is stable in the Svatove Operational Area. In the Kreminna Operational Area, Ukraine has had success in the forests south of Kreminna, and we already made adjustments to the line of conflict. We are looking at reports that Ukrainian forces regained as much as a kilometer of territory near Dibrova. In the Lysychansk Operational Direction, Ukrainian forces pushed back east of Verknokamyanske. Some analysts are reporting this as gains toward Zolotarivka, but we have considered the settlement as contested since July.
Northeast Donetsk: The situation is stable in the Siversk operational area; intense fighting continues east of Spirne and north of Soledar. Our reluctance to mark Krasna Hora as captured by the Russians, despite reports from reliable sources (beyond Strelkov), was well placed. The situation remains extremely difficult. We're working on confirming reports that Russian troops were pushed back from the M-03 Highway west of Paraskoviivka, breaking the salient. Our confidence is high that is the reality. South of Bakhmut, there are multiple reports that Ukrainian reinforcements staged a counteroffensive and pushed PMC Wagner units back from Ivanivske and Stupochky. We are working on confirming, and these are not big gains. Our confidence is very high. The fact that reinforcements continue to move into Bakhmut and troop rotations are ongoing indicates that the supply lines remain open. However, as we said in September, we maintain that the Kremlin and PMC Wagner are totally invested in the capture of Bakhmut at all costs.
Southwest Donetsk: No change around Avdiivka - a lot of attacks and a lot of dead Russian soldiers, as it has been for months. We believe that Marinka is the Soledar of the south. Russia will do everything and anything to capture the dust on the map, and Marinka has been reduced to dust. Russian forces continue to attack from the south, hitting some of the rear areas of the Ukrainian defenses in the western part of the rubble. The Ukrainian claims that Russia lost 32 armored vehicles on January 27 at Vuhledar are now fact (31 visually confirmed, visual confirmation doesn't capture all losses). By our estimation, total losses are over 50 vehicles between January 27 and February 7. This is approaching a brigade becoming combat ineffective.
Zaporizhia: Artillery only (mostly), with both combatants claiming large reserves are being moved into the area.
Belarus/Ukraine Border: Nothing burger
Kyiv-Chernihiv Belarus-Russian Border: Nothing burger beyond an uptick of artillery strikes on the Chernihiv border but nothing to a level of condition setting.
Sumy Russian Border: Cross-border shelling but nothing rising to a level of condition setting.
Kharkiv: A Russian Mi-24 gunship was shot down just outside of Russian-controlled Tokarivka, right on the very northern edge of our gray zone southeast of Dvorichna. We are digging hard to determine if Ukrainian forces are further east than in our previous analysis. Downing a helicopter east of Vilshana with MANPADS indicates something is happening here.
General Observations: Russian VKS and army aviation activity have increased dramatically. Weather conditions have improved, but even accounting for the mostly clear skies, the increase indicates the large-scale offensive has started across the Theatre of War. Although artillery increased, we did not see the massive barrages that occurred in the early summer on Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, Hirske-Zolote, and Slovyansk. Or what we saw around Avdiivka and Marinka in August or in the Kherson region in September. The ammunition issue for Russian forces appears to be very real. Some are suggesting that Russian forces are engaging in shaping operations before a bigger push, but if the suggested "February 11" big offensive day is the reality, we would be seeing huge artillery barrages now.
Although we believe Russia has legitimate supply issues with cruise missiles, the 13-day break from large-scale missile or drone strikes is almost certainly more related to poor weather conditions than a lack of resources.
On the suggestion that the new wave of mobiks will be more effective because logistics issues were resolved and they have received better and longer training, we do not see that. The newly minted units being pushed into battle show little improvement. It is unclear if this is due to ineffective training or Russian reliance on overwhelming artillery support, which no longer exists. Mobiks are no longer speed bumps but aren't very effective and have not demonstrated any ability to fight using combined arms tactics.
Initiative: Ukraine still holds it, but Russia is trying to take it away. The balance is slowly tipping toward Russia, but Russia has not forced Ukraine to move resources where they don't want to. What about Bakhmut? That's been going on since May - initiative is when you're enemy has to react to your actions. Russia has not accomplished this. An example is Kherson - Russia was forced to react to Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts in August, stopping progress in the Donbas. Russia then had to move those same troops to Kreminna in Luhansk to fill the Wagner Line gap. The Kremlin is still reacting.
The Big Picture: It is unclear to us if this is Russia is conducting a mass probing for weaknesses along a 1,000-kilometer front, which, if discovered, will result in a Russian push in that direction or a fundamental change in tactics. In Soledar and Bakhmut, the use of squad and platoon sized units in repeated waves of attacks on the same position has been more effective than the large-scale waves of company and battalion-size attacks Russia did in October and November, that only produced unsustainable losses. The losses are still unsustainable if the Kremlin cared about the Russian people, but they are yielding results. However, it is one thing to do this over a 30-kilometer line of conflict versus a 1,000-kilometer one. Although Ukraine is bringing in reserve forces to Bakhmut, we are not seeing a mass deployment of deep Ukrainian reserves that continue to sit on the sidelines. The glimpse we did get of Ukrainian reserve force capabilities in Zaporizhia at the beginning of January and Vuhledar at the end of January shows they are well-trained, well-equipped, motivated, and skilled in combined arms maneuver warfare. We saw a similar demonstration of this in northern Bakhmut yesterday.
Comments
Wow. God be with the Ukrainians. Hard to motivate mobiks when they know the are already dead before the hit the front.
Great update, thanks for all your hard work
