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Russia-Ukraine Mini SITREP for 10 FEB 2023 17:30 PST - Quick Update
🕑 Added 2023-02-11 01:40:47 +0000 UTCLuhansk: The situation is stable in the Svatove and Kreminna Operational Areas. There are indications that Ukrainian forces took some ground back southwest of Dibrova, but we wouldn't get too excited. Fighting in the Serebryanskyy Woods is similar to the fighting in "Sherwood Forest" southwest of Izyum, only at a larger scale. Positional warfare of squad and platoon size, artillery, drones, recon in force, and position swapping.
Northeast Donetsk: The situation is stable in the Siversk operational area, and there is no other news. Ukraine is holding Krasna Hora and Paraskoviivka, and they are not in a technical or operation encirclement. Supplies and reinforcements are moving in. The wounded are moving out. It is extremely difficult. The source that indicated Russia had reached the M-03 Highway walked it back today, which is why the defense is holding.
Bakhmut, the situation is stable, and it was a little quieter. Numerous claims Ukraine pushed back to the north, which is likely true given the situation at Paraskoviivka, but there isn't visual proof. No changes to the east, and things quieted down on the southern edge.
South of Bakhmut, yesterday's reports of a Ukrainian counteroffensive out of Ivanivke and Stupochky appear to have been true. The good news is that Russian forces were reportedly pushed back, with the bad news being is artillery has turned the area where they were into a no man's land. Neither combatant can advance - a World War I situation.
There are reports that the T-514 Highway between Stupochky and Ivanivke is no longer under Russian fire control. However, this isn't because of Ukrainian battlefield success. Russian artillery is blocking the Ukrainian counteroffensive and doesn't have the resources to keep the road under fire control. It remains very dangerous.
Southwest Donetsk: Video is out of the failed Russian offensive out of Opytne (the one by the Donetsk International Airport), and it is Vuhledar bad. We visually confirmed 11 destroyed armored vehicles, including tanks, and dozens of dead Russian soldiers - dozens. There is fury in the Russian milblogger world over the losses, with at least one battalion combat destroyed. From January 25 to February 9, Russian forces may have had up to two brigades rendered combat destroyed - certainly, they are combat ineffective.
Quick hot take, between Vuhledar, Marinka, and Avdiivka, losses over the last 10 days of armored vehicles are approaching Bilohorivka levels (80ish). Our estimated losses are around 60, with 45 visually confirmed (that doesn't include the 6 stuck in the mud at Myrne as, eventually, they'll drag them out).
Two Russian milbloggers, including Strelkov (who did get Krasna Hora wrong so...), are claiming that further large-scale offensive operations from Niu York to Velyka Novasilka are on hold because losses are so high, there have been mass refusals of multiple units - including by some Russian claims a full battalion. Not June 2022, hey 450 is a battalion - a fully staffed 1,000 troops battalion.
Zaporizhia: Russian forces made some advances around Myrne - the one southwest of Hulyaipole. This is a flat, open area, and Myrne is little more than a speck on the map.
Belarus/Ukraine Border: Nothing burger
Kyiv-Chernihiv Belarus-Russian Border: Nothing burger, and interestingly, there wasn't as much artillery activity as yesterday.
Sumy Russian Border: Cross-border shelling but nothing rising to a level of condition setting.
Kharkiv: No change with significant artillery and small positional battles throughout the area. We still consider this a region of high interest.
Nationwide: Russia launched another seven Shahed-136 kamikaze drones after the missile attacks, with initial reports of Ukraine air defenses going 7 for 7. Officials report there was damage to the electrical infrastructure from the earlier attack, but nothing catastrophic. One nuclear power plant was de-energized but was able to shut down safely. We did write just hours before the attack, "Although we believe Russia has legitimate supply issues with cruise missiles, the 13-day break from large-scale missile or drone strikes is almost certainly more related to poor weather conditions than a lack of resources."
We just didn't expect a blitz 10 hours later on the first sunny day.
General Observations: Russian VKS and army aviation activity increased again, not factoring in the Tu-95 and Mig-31K activity today. Artillery is continuing unabated but not seeing an additional increase. Kalibr cruise missiles continued to play a limited role, and we agree with other assessments that Russia is firing what they can build - 20 to 25 a month.
This morning (our time), we were unsure if today's missile strikes were just a continuation of punitive strikes or if this signaled that a much larger offensive was starting. We were surprised that they committed to the strikes due to poor weather preventing significant reconnaissance, which may be a contributing factor to the somewhat ineffectiveness of today's attack despite its scope. There are no indications that condition setting happened because there was not wide-scale targeting of command and control centers, transportation infrastructure, communications, or military assets.
This is Interesting: A very credible video of a Russian unmanned surface vessel making a kamikaze strike on the Zotoka Bridge southwest of Odesa has been shared. Wait, the same bridge that was destroyed in May and repeatedly attacked all summer and will take a year to fix? Yes. With the Zatoka bridge disabled, we don't understand why Russia would announce the existence of these drones this way, choosing a target that is disabled and can't shoot back. Oh wait, wait, now it makes sense.
Initiative: Ukraine still holds it, and if Strelkov is reporting the truth that Ukraine's battlefield successes have forced Russian commanders to put other assaults on hold, Ukraine tightened its grip.
The Big Picture: The claims coming from Kyiv that Russia has assembled 500,000 troops, 1,800 tanks, and 400 aircraft are highly likely to be untrue. If Russia has assembled a combat force of 500,000 - that's everyone. That's every active duty soldier they have, including OMON and territorial guard. 1,800 tanks would also represent their entire available operating equipment - everything. There wouldn't be one operational main battle tank left 150 kilometers east of the Ukraine border. As for 400 aircraft, the issue isn't the planes and helicopters but the pilots and logistics. It would be a similar situation - this would be close to everything they have.
Is it possible? Sure. If the Russian Ministry of Defense had convinced Putin that going Russia-Japanese War 1905 all in everything we have, it could be possible. But if that is the case, Russia's basic defenses and internal security apparatus are down to oblast-based resources, units attached to the Kremlin that are meant to protect Russian leaders, naval assets outside of the Black Sea area, and their nuclear triad.
Why is Ukraine saying this? Because they legitimately do need more armor, aircraft, and longer-range weapons, and they are trying to add pressure in the public information space. The negative impact is that it legitimately scares their own population and is starting to hurt homefront morale.
