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Russia-Ukraine Flash Report 20 FEB 2023 13:00 PST - This is as Good as it Gets
🕑 Added 2023-02-20 22:13:16 +0000 UTCMany people on both sides of the front ask themselves, where is the big Russian offensive? There was supposed to be a big Russian offensive!
Russia has massed 300K, 350K, and even 500K troops trained not for eight days but for eight weeks. The supply and logistics issues have been worked out. The mobiks, nothing more than speed bumps in October and November, stiffened in December and started finding some success in January.
The attack on Bakhmut and Soledar, culminating in December, turned into victory at all costs. It was the last days of General Surovikin's command of all Russian forces in Ukraine. On January 11, Valery Gerasimov took over operations in Ukraine, and Surovikin, who was a PMC Wagner ally, was made Gerasimov's deputy.
Putin's obsession with symbolism and dates surely had to mean that Russia would go big before February 24 to form some kind of victory at the one-year mark of the 3 to 14 days "special military operation." Russia will attack from Belarus toward Kyiv! Russia will attack from Belgorod in Kharkiv! Russia will attack Hulyaipole and Orikhiv in Zaporizhia! And through it all, the attacks continued in Bakhmut.
By late January, there was a steady increase in Russian combat operations throughout the theater of war. A push in Zaporizhia that Russian milbloggers grossly exaggerated went nowhere. Russians moved from defense to active defense to smaller offensives in Luhansk. The attacks on Bilohorivkas (both of them) and Spirne became much more intense. Russia started repeatedly attacking Verkhnokamyanske in Donetsk, and by the end of January, "Bakhmut will fall soon" was on the tip of many tongues.
We kept looking at the data. Where Russia was attacking, what resources they were using, and where troops were positioned. Instead of falling back on the only successful strategy the Kremlin has employed, this was an attack everywhere simultaneously. Instead of focusing all available combat power like at Severodonetsk and Mariupol, Russia was trying to stretch Ukrainian forces out.
On February 1, there was a debate among the team. We were convinced the large-scale offensive had started, but we were unsure of one critical point. Were these shaping operations to support an even larger push, or was this it? Was this all the combat power Russia had?
We saw the same reports of a huge mass of Russian units in Kreminna, including airborne and naval infantry. While the 76th VDV committed atrocities in Bucha and Irpin and got shredded in retreat, to get shredded again in Izyum, they performed well in Kherson, holding Davydiv Brid for months under repeated attacks, and for the last 6 to 8 weeks, contested ground lines of communication (GLOCs). The counterargument? While these units are VDV and naval infantry, eight-week-trained mobiks aren't the same quality. These are elite units on paper.
The other side of the debate was whether we trust our lying eyes. If Russia has suddenly "solved" its logistics problems, why are the Donetsk People's Republic and Wagner PMC using World War II era D-1 152 mm howitzers? If Russia suddenly "discovered" they didn't have rusty AK-74s (not a typo) and AKMs, why were they handing out rusty and broken weapons in September? If Russia has suddenly found hundreds of modern infantry fighting vehicles and main battle tanks, why are they fielding T-62s and BMP-1s? If Russia has solved its ammunition problem and has deep artillery equipment reserves, why is artillery fire down 60% from six months ago? Why are tanks being used for indirect fire until their barrels are worn out?
By February 3, we were convinced that this was it. This was the big offensive. There would not be a multi-brigade, combined arms attack using maneuver warfare tactics to break through Ukrainian's defense in depth. Like Ukraine did in Kharkiv and like Ukraine did in the opening days of the second push in Kherson in mid-October.
For example, the day before the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine announced the second counteroffensive in Kherson (the first being in August), artillery units completed over 550 fire missions, and there were over 40 airstrikes on the west side of the Dnipro. NASA FIRMS showed the line of conflict clearly, with the Russian side of the line of conflict in flames. This was after weeks of destroying enemy air defense (DEAD) operations and severing Russian Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC) over the Dnipro to the best of Ukraine's ability. We didn't need an experienced military officer to tell us that a large offensive was imminent. This is what an effective army does to set conditions.
We kept looking for this type of condition setting by Russian forces, but it never happened. The Russian VKS and army aviation became more active, and artillery fire increased in some areas, but nothing that rose to the level of condition setting or shaping exercises.
On February 4, we made the public call. Russia's large-scale offensive has started, and the strategy is to attack everywhere with everything. By this time, the Zaporizhia offensive was long over, Vuhledar was a disaster, and Russia would suffer an equally bad loss of manpower and equipment north of Opytne near Avdiivka. Two weeks earlier, Russia had suffered another blow north of Vodyane.
Another week passed, and our confidence that Russia would press harder somewhere faded away. The heavy losses were having a ripple effect.
The biggest problem for the Russian military has never been addressed. Gerasimov's plan wasn't just "attack in all directions and let me know how it goes." The Russian military is commanded from the top down. There do not have non-commissioned officers. Troops in the field are not allowed to deviate from their orders - to overcome, adapt, and improvise. Company, battalion, and brigade commanders can't have constructive conversations on what else they need to be successful. You have your orders. Now fulfill them, or else.
Or else what?
Exactly.
Russian units at the company, platoon, and squad levels still lack radio communications equipment. Battalion commanders don't know where their troops are or their progress, so they make it up. In the Russian military, "I need radios to know what is going on" is not an answer. Jamming equipment to block Ukrainian drones also blocks Russian cell phones and their ERA-secured communication system. And after a year of the war, Russia still has a policy of destroying cell towners and infrastucture despite their need to use those communication systems.
The 155th and 40th Naval Infantry and the 11th Brigade of the 1st Army Corps of the Donetsk People's Republic (or RF Armed Forces?!?!) weren't supposed to become combat destroyed at the start of February. They were supposed to capture Vuhledar and move to their next objectives. The 144th Regiment in Kherson wasn't supposed to be combat ineffective now. They were supposed to take Terny, Yampolivka, Nevske, and Torske. The 150th wasn't supposed to be combat destroyed, they were supposed to take Marinka.
Now the complaints of ammunition shortages have spread beyond PMC Wagner and include Kreminna, Avdiivka, and Marinka. Russian mobiks are stripping Ukrainian soldiers of boots and warm weather gear. Russian troops are attacking Vuhledar without weapons. They aren't rumors. There are pictures and videos, and the data shows it. These are not acts of a competent army.
Russian armor played a larger role at the beginning of February, but tactics were not improved. That should have been expected. Russia sent its experienced military instructors to the front in April and May. We reported on it. We shared multiple videos from the Russian Ministry of Defense showing training exercises where troops were being taught poorly, or worse, being taught to do things that would get them killed. Complaints continued, although there were fewer, of waiting for weeks with no actual training. Russian mobiks trained to use tanks arrived in Ukraine to find no tanks were available. Russian mobiks who trained to fire artillery arrived to find there were no howitzers or self-propelled guns. We saw in Vuhledar Russian armor blundering into minefields, clustering together under artillery fire, running over their own troops, and being abandoned by their crews.
During the previous week, we saw another trend. The number and ferocity of Russian attacks were starting to fade. The attacks from Verkhnokamyanske to Berestove stopped. Zaporizhia quieted down. The grinding attacks on Marinka and the Avdiivka and the number of artillery strikes diminished. Russian losses were catastrophic - equipment - material - manpower. There was far less armor, less artillery support, and more charges by unsupported light infantry who were so negligently trained that their instructors should be criminally charged.
Russian commanders couldn't understand where fresh Ukrainian troops were coming from and how could they just keep coming. Ukrainian combat losses have also been severe, particularly in Marinka and Bakhmut, but nothing has changed in the Kremlin in a year. If you read the Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Reports, the daily casualties numbers are so high that if they were true, Ukraine's military would have collapsed months ago. Russian losses in Vuhledar, as one easy example, far exceed Ukrainian losses.
In World War II, the Germans made the same mistake during the Battle of Britain. German aircrews provided inflated numbers of British losses, convincing Berlin that "just one more attack" would break the British air force. History would show that the losses were exaggerated by 300%.
We no longer believe there will be a larger attack elsewhere, and time is no longer on Russia's side. Ukraine is training multiple brigades, and they aren't sitting in hovels pretending to be barracks learning how to sing patriotic songs and going to the rifle range to learn to shoot with no ammunition. By the time the spring mud dries, Ukraine will have amassed multiple motor infantry brigades with an NCO corps trained to NATO standards. The Russian milbloggers and military commanders paying attention know this, and they are angry and worried.
Gerasimov's strategy wasn't unsound, considering the quality of military intelligence he received. Just one more push, and Ukraine will run out of manpower. The Kremlin tried to seize the battlefield initiative by attempting to spread Ukrainian forces out. Force Ukraine to move their troops and equipment when and where the Russian Ministry of Defense dictated it. Instead, they found Ukraine has reserve forces between the line of conflict and the mechanized brigades and tank battalions waiting for the spring. Reserves moved into Vuhledar and ended the Russian offensive in a day. Reserves moved south of Hulyaipole and Orikhiv, ending the Russian offensive in two days. Ukrainian commanders did not have to choose Kreminna or Bakhmut.
Are we declaring the big offensive dead? Has it culminated? No. The theater of war is moving to a similar state that it was in during August before the Kharkiv counteroffensive. Bakhmut and Marinka will remain very challenging. The continued defense of Marinka is becoming impractical because there is nothing left to defend, and it is painfully clear that Russia can't turn operational successes into further tactical or strategic advances.
While the situation in Bakhmut is tough for Ukrainian forces, we agree with our favorite war criminal, Igor Streklov Girkin. Can Russian troops extend the pincers all the way around Bakhmut, cut the GLOCs, defend their eastern lines and flanks to prevent a breakthrough, and protect their own GLOCS, and still have enough troop strength to attack the garrison in the city? Girkin has doubts, and so do we. Ukraine is committed to defending the city, and Russia might be committed to capturing it. I write "might be committed" because the decision to strangle PMC Wagner at this point in time is a Hitler in the bunker grade decision.
If you're waiting for shock and awe, you'll need to wait for another 8 to 12 weeks. Unless Russian President Vladimir Putin announces something unexpected tomorrow, the next shock and awe attack is coming, and it will be led by Ukrainian forces.
Comments
Thanks for all the kudos, everyone. This was one of the highest-stakes analyses we made. We didn't have as clear a picture as we did in Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, Kharkiv-Izyum, and to a lesser extent Kherson. We had a high level of doubt because we did expect a "shock fist," as the Russians say - somewhere.
Definitely - with the difference being no surround and not 25K to 80K dead civilians.
Graham Thom
I agree with my peers here on Patreon. Outstanding flash report. Your insights and methodology are excellent in concert with your Site Reps. Keep it up, those of us that read/listen to your work have nothing but a thumbs up for you. Outstanding ๐
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My hot take, there is a solid possibility that Putin will declare Bakhmut "liberated" in his speech.
So, do you think Marinka will become another Mariupol...where Russia claims "victory" over a rubble heap?
Great flash report. Really really great. Really good summary of this war in Ukraine. This should be submitted to the new yorker or the new york times or some other periodical.
Thank you!
The usual as he has said for a year
What would Putin ssays tomorrow?
Great update, and we hear the same more and more (example below). You guys were tip of the spear in this assessment. Great work! https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1627309441837154304?s=20
