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Russia-Ukraine Flash Report 10 MAY 2023 13:30 PDT - We Analyze Yevgeny Prigozin's Commentary
🕑 Added 2023-05-10 22:22:01 +0000 UTCPrivate Military Company Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin's latest drama is interesting. Breaking it down sentence by sentence. Prepare for some snark.
The funny thing about reputation and respect. What can take years to build and create can be destroyed in minutes. Just as Chechen Akhmat's fearsome reputation was exposed as a fraud, so is PMC Wagner's. Here is Prigozhin's latest.
"1. Bakhmut has no strategic importance;"
ASSESSMENT: Practically every Western analyst, military expert (real experts, not the Twitterarti), and many Russian milbloggers said the same thing as far back as August 2022. It ceased having any strategic value on September 11, 2022, as Russian forces and PMC Wagner executed a retrograde operation out of Izyum. I'm glad you finally admitted it. That means you've been wasting your efforts here since August, as the first direct attack on Bakhmut was August 8, 2022, and you repeatedly stated that it was of strategic importance.
"2. Bakhmut was needed in order to, after the failures and retreat of the RF Armed Forces from Kharkiv, Kherson, and other regions, build up offensive potential, grind the enemy’s manpower and enable the Russian army to mobilize;"
ASSESSMENT: Why the spin? There weren't "other regions" for the failures of the Russian military. There was the Kharkiv counteroffensive which caused a full retreat, and the Kherson counteroffensive, which caused a retrograde operation. A masterfully executed retrograde operation, by the way. No, there was no "operation meatgrinder." You didn't engage in an offensive operation against a well-prepared and increasingly better-armed and trained combatant with more layers to their defense than a properly made croissant to grind them down. How do we know that? Because Eugene, you claim "operation meat grinder" started in October, and the Russian Federation did their retrograde operation out of Kherson on November 10. In Kherson, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine asked for total operational security from analysts and journalists and even contacted our tiny operation. They asked for no map updates, no video releases, no pictures, and no geolocation. That was also October 8. If the goal was to enable the build-up of Russian combat potential starting October 8, you failed because Ukraine did not abandon the Kherson counteroffensive and rush troops to Bakhmut. On the contrary, every objective analyst, including Russians, was wondering why PMC Wagner's combat potential was being wasted in strategically unimportant Bakhmut while Kherson was falling apart and the Russian Ministry of Defense abandoned the third Avdiivka offensive to send resources to Bakhmut - oh and that was in mid-October too.
"3. In view of the fear of internal competition, PMC "Wagner" began to "dry" in terms of personnel, weapons and ammunition, artificially reducing combat potential;"
ASSESSMENT: Eugene. That was always the plan. The minute your ego started writing checks your PMC couldn't cash in the public information space attacking Shoigu, Lapin, the Kremlin, and the Russian military as ineffective, that became the plan. You're operating through the lens of the misguided belief that Russian President Vladimir Putin cares about you and your "boys." He doesn't care about any of it. Just like the Tzars didn't care about their people. History Eugene. Do you think because you're an oligarch now and were Putin's strong-arm fixer once upon a time that, deep down inside, he doesn't see you as his obedient and ambitious caterer? He doesn't take your calls anymore. Forget getting invited to events, you're literally persona non grata in the Kremlin. Our team was already warning in November that you were a threat to the Kremlin because of the language you were using, of growing nationalism with political ambition. We wondered if the Kremlin could see it. When they cut you off from recruitment at the start of the year, we could see that by the first week of May, you would face a massive personnel problem. The same time you were cut off from recruiting is the same week you went "all in" at Soledar and Bakhmut. You took the bait. Yes. The Kremlin wants PMC Wagner destroyed because you've become a threat to the people who are really in power, holding their power. I have breaking news - you're not one of them, and there is no seat at the table for you.
"4. The effectiveness of the “Bakhmut meat grinder” decreased in April-May 2023, the Armed Forces of Ukraine gathered for a counteroffensive;"
ASSESSMENT: No. The effectiveness of the Bakhmut meat grinder, if it even existed, ended in mid-February when you did your first video with a field full of dead Wagnerites screaming you were cut off from ammunition. PMC Wagner had a four to six-week period at the most where you effectively reduced your losses from a ratio of 1:5 to 1:7 - not in PMC Wagner's favor - to 1:3 and a few days where it was 1:1. That peaked in early February when the Twitter experts wailed for Ukraine to withdraw. Russian combat potential was already fading theaterwide by mid-February as the Russian winter offensive was poorly executed and failed - theaterwide. There is no Russian combat potential left beyond a reserve of 120,000 troops who have minimal training, no heavy weapons, inadequate armor, and lack artillery support, antiarmor weapons, and are dealing with broken logistics.
"5. Due to the reduction in personnel, PMC "Wagner" was forced to transfer the flanks to the military;"
ASSESSMENT: Yes. In March. This proves that the "operation meat grinder" had already failed in March, not in April or May - if it ever existed. Russia didn't build up combat potential Eugene. By March, it was squandered. Eugene? Where did those forces to protect your flanks come from? That's right, Kreminna, Svatove, and Adviivka. You know, the other locations where Russian forces were making at least marginal progress that is now not only gone but getting chipped away. Have you looked at a map around Kupyansk lately? Where is that Russian combat potential you helped build up at the expense of your PMC? Eugene - it was always about destroying you and PMC Wagner.
"6. There is a serious risk of encirclement of PMC "Wagner" in Bakhmut as a result of the failure of the flanks. The flanks are already cracking and falling through;"
ASSESSMENT: Let me look at the map. No. No, there isn't. Unless your combat potential is so destroyed and you have committed all your reserves and have no third echelon to protect your Ground Lines of Communication into Bakhmut. Eugene? Do you not have a third echelon and reserve forces left? Is the Russian Ministry of Defense not willing to send any more bodies to strategically unimportant Bakhmut because your job was to lure all of Ukraine's combat potential to Bakhmut, which didn't happen? Are you trying to egg on the up to 33 brigades of reserves that are sitting back and awaiting orders and for mud to dry out, which is happening over the next three to five days, for a more critical military target? Weren't you screaming that Ukrainian forces had amassed 200,000 troops in Chasiv Yar and Kostyantynivka in February and were ready to destroy you? Eugene, you've become the boy who cried wolf too many times, claiming "We're going to be encircled." You started off so well on your 14 points too.
"7. In the absence of ammunition, the "meat grinder" will work in the opposite direction: the Armed Forces of Ukraine will destroy PMC "Wagner";"
ASSESSMENT: Aren't you the same guy who has made more than one video showing fields of your dead, ranting about how your "boys" are being ground down? Aren't multiple PMC Wagner graveyards popping up across Russia now as fast as you can dig holes in the ground? Isn't PMC Wagner burying some of your "boys" without even telling family members they're dead or they're having a funeral? Eugene. The minute the Russian Ministry of Defense said, "Hey, here is an idea, we'll take the flanks, and you can take Bakhmut all by yourself," it became "Russian Ministry of Defense Operation PMC Wagner Meatgrinder."
"8. I demand ammunition in order to save the lives of the fighters and “put the squeeze on” Bakhmut, in which there are about 5% left occupied by the enemy;"
ASSESSMENT: Demand? I'm sure that is going over quite well in the Kremlin. I think I can hear Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu laughing from here. Demand? Eugene, come closer. Closer. There is no excess ammunition, and there is a critical shortage of powder charges! The only way you're getting more ammunition and powder charges is if they take it from another operational area. Eugene, on May 6, that last 5% was unimportant and was never your goal to capture Bakhmut. Remember writing that? The path to Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Kostyantynivka had already been laid open. Remember? Are you hoping we forgot? Are you hoping the Kremlin forgot? Let me look at the map. Huh. Those are the same areas that Russian forces are meant to control, and they aren't doing a very good job at it. Toward Kostyantynivka, everything is going backward.
"9. At the moment, within the city of Bakhmut, there is only Wagner PMC; there are no other units. Outside Bakhmut - only the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, PMC "Wagner" is not there;"
ASSESSMENT: But Eugene, that's not true either. Or if it is, you lied earlier and, in the process, further insulted the people - let me check notes - responsible for providing you with ammunition. I have another question. I thought part of being a private military company was you secured your own ammunition through licensing and permits issued by your government. If PMC Wagner is independent of the Kremlin and not a glorified extension of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, why are you dependent on Russian logistics, equipment, and ammunition?
"10. PMC "Wagner" planned to leave Bakhmut to save the lives of fighters and minimize senseless losses since the remnants of ammunition were only enough until the end of the day on May 9, 2023;"
ASSESSMENT: Well, you didn't plan it. You threw a fit over ammunition and released an ultimatum. Then on May 9, you said you were told you and your boys would face "treason" if you withdrew from Bakhmut. See Eugene, that's the problem. Groups like us document the war, and we spent a lot of time documenting you because, in part, the only thing going on after November 11 was the "why are they doing this" offensive in Bakhmut. Eugene, we concluded the right move, even if you wanted to do an "operational meatgrinder," was to forget Bakhmut and force Avdiivka. You had the combat strength in January, but not anymore. But you didn't plan to leave Bakhmut on May 9. You're combat destroyed, and your subordinates in the field are telling you that we need bodies or we need an impossible amount of ammunition as a substitute for bodies. You will never get 80,000, 32,000, not even 10,000 shells a day because the Russian Ministry of Defense doesn't have it.
"11. The top leadership of the country was instructed by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to provide PMC "Wagner" with everything necessary;"
ASSESSMENT: That's what they told you. Just like you were told in February. Instructed by who? Shoigu? Gerasimov? The same people you've been publicly insulting and politically attacking since September 2022? You promised Bakhmut in September, err October, err November, err by the end of the year, by February, by April. You've gotten more time to finish your assigned task than any other Russian general in the Kremlin. Seventeen changes in leadership, and the only four still standing from the start of the war are you, Kadyrov, Shoigu, and Gerasimov. PMC Wagner will get just enough to continue to keep your forces in place and assure your destruction in Ukraine.
"12. On the night of May 6-7, 2023, a combat order was issued promising to give Wagner PMC ammunition;"
ASSESSMENT: Yes. We all saw that. If it is going to happen, Russian logistics can't move that fast. Heck, during Operational Desert Storm in 1991, the coalition forces couldn't move as fast as you're expecting. Even if there was ammunition to give you the 32,000 shells a day you're asking for, this isn't a matter of going to the hypermart in Donetsk and filling up shopping carts with 152 mm ammunition. Your nearest major logistics centers are a minimum of 85 kilometers away and, let me check notes, the Russian Federation has a critical shortage of trucks. Do you know how many UAZ loafs it's going to take to move 32,000 shells and the powder charges every day?
"13. During the day of May 8-9, 2023, the required amount of ammunition was not issued. Until now, ammunition has been filtered to a minimum;"
ASSESSMENT: How many examples in the military exist where generals and leaders didn't get the promised reinforcements, ammunition, heavy equipment, air support, or other critical need for their mission? When General Anthony C. McAuliffe was told to surrender at Bastogne, he didn't rant to the Associated Press about how Eisenhower hated him and won't give him his requested ammunition. He told the German command "nuts," mobilized even the wounded, rationed ammo, and fought with superior tactics. He eventually got relieved. When Vasily Chuikov was pushed up against the Volga River with a handful of men in surrounding pockets, he didn't send a cable to Stalin declaring, "if I don't get more ammunition by November 25, we are leaving Stalingrad." Eugene. You're a weak leader. You've never had a fair fight in your life, apparently. Good leaders go, "Blyat," and then figure out what to do with the resources they have. They don't create a public spectacle. In the Stalingrad scenario, you're not even Chuikov, your von Paulus in late October, and Eugene, you can't blame the weather.
14. PMC "Wagner" continues the offensive in Bakhmut and is awaiting a decision on the issuance of ammunition and weapons in the required quantity.
ASSESSMENT: Wait. You wrote 13 points explaining why you have to leave Bakhmut and can't maintain the offensive. You wrote and said on May 6 and 7 your forces have exhausted all combat potential. You were pushed back in the north (admitted maybe a block and a couple of hundred meters at Khromove) and can no longer progress. Objectively Eugene, it's a frozen front. You're awaiting a decision on the issuance of ammunition? You're going to be waiting a long time.
Comments
I appreciate your snark so much. It’s an art form and you are a master artist.
But didin't they find guns&munition for a million soldiers?
If this is a Colonel Kilgore reference, this is absolutely outstanding
1 - my hot take - yes (that is not the team analysis) 2 - the issue is less about ammunition and more about powder charges which are critically low and we continue to see examples of how Russian forces lack antitank weapons - the team maintains that while the ammunition shortage is artificial, Russia cannot return to its days of a year ago firing 60,000+ shells a day
Eugene don’t surf!
Ethan Stein
good lord. that is totally insane. Did they think Bakhmut would fall? I guess they did. Or do you think they had no choice but to hope.
Thanks for the explanation. It makes more sense now. Here’s what I think are a couple of key strategic questions (based on a few sources, mainly Ukraine: The Latest, a podcast from The Telegraph): 1. Does Ukraine have enough resources now for major counteroffensive wins on more than one, narrow front, given the Russian fortifications and reserves? 2. Does Russia (a) have a true ammunition shortage, or (b) are they stockpiling it (being prudent, for once, from their perspective) to repel the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive - or both (a) and (b)? I wish the answers were Yes to 1 and only (a) to 2, but I’d really like to hear your take.
1000% this. Exactly this. Spot on this. When did "Operational Meatgrinder" start per Prigozhin? October 8. When was General Sergey Surovikin put in charge of all troops in Ukraine? October 8. Who got demoted on January 11? Who hatched the withdrawal out of Kherson and started setting conditions in the information space to accept another 'goodwill gesture" in late October? General Sergey Surovikn. Who got fired on January 11, just days before the start of the Winter Offensive? General Sergey Surovikn. Bakhmut was 100% about giving the Russian Ministry of Defense something to point out and say, "see, victory."
I do love your editorial insights. Keep it up! And I don’t need info if it breaks operational security. I am safe and sound in Pennsylvania. Just keep me informed when it is safe to do so. Thx
It appears their "effective fighting force" comes from blocking troops and massive artillery support, not from superior skill and tactics.
Because if Prigozhin abandons Bakhmut, it will have a major impact on Russian combat operations theaterwide. There is nothing to plug the gap with. It also reinforces a key point - Russia is short on ammunition, and its logistics have major problems. That points to their ability to respond to offensive operations by Ukraine. Ya, he's a villain, and this has become a clown show in a clown car (Girkin's Black Clown), but he is exposing everything broken with the Ministry of Defense. There is a purpose to this. Further, he is actively spreading disinformation and trying to rewrite his own history - the truth matters.
I love it. Sometimes it's good to vent, and I'm here for it 😅.
Is the Russian military capable of learning? My understanding is that Wagner was the most effective fighting force, even if their leader is throwing a Trumpian tantrum.
It’s good snark and a detailed critique, but to what purpose? Assuming that everything you wrote is correct, why is it important to spend so much time on this villain’s ravings? Ukrainian leadership has been suggesting not to dwell on his nonsense, probably with good reason. It is emotionally satisfying to show the stupidly of evil in detail, and anticipate its downfall. But aside from that, if Bakhmut is not strategically important, as you imply, then how about focussing on what is strategically important? Which is what?
AnaR737
Wow, amazing, thank you David. Around the time when the whole post-Kharkiv and pre-liberation of Kherson thing was going on, some people claimed that there had been some kind of arrangement by which the Bakhmut offensive was conceived as a kind of "compensation" so Surovikin could convince Putin to withdraw from Kherson. If that is true, it sounds more plausible than saying he was meant to "rescue" the Russian effort by attacking a non-strategic city. How is doing that going to "rescue" anything?
