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Special Report - Being a Successful Russian General is Bad for Your Career
🕑 Added 2023-08-24 01:34:15 +0000 UTCRussia hasn't had a lot of operational successes or strategic victories since February 24, 2022, in Ukraine, for the men who led Russian forces to those victories, the title of Hero of Russia or the aftermath of victories has been followed by obscurity, demotion, arrest, and death.
Colonel-General Mihhail Mizintsev
Accomplishment: The Capture of Mariupol
General Mizintsev is known as the Butcher of Mariupol and is responsible for 25,000 to 100,000 civilian deaths caused during the 86-day siege of the city. He is widely believed to be the mastermind behind the World War II-style aerial bombardment and indiscriminate shelling of the city. He is accused of setting up the filtration camp structure and ordering attacks on declared green corridors. On September 24, 2022, he was reassigned to Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia and was responsible for military logistics. He was considered a Prigozhin loyalist, and on April 27, 2023, he was fired by Russian President Vladimir Putin. An official reason was never given, but it was believed that Mizintsev was the person who leaked information to PMC Wagner that their ammunition shipments were being denied and that Russia was holding large ammunition reserves in anticipation of Ukraine's spring offensive. A week after he was fired, Mizintsev joined PMC Wagner's Council of Commanders and did a frontline inspection of Wagner mercenaries in Bakhmut. A day after his inspection, Prigozhin declared that he was withdrawing his mercenaries as of May 10. The status of Mizintsev is unclear, with claims that he was detained after the Prigozhin Insurrection. He has not been seen publicly since June 2023.
Lieutenant General Mikhal Zusko
Accomplishment: The capture of Kherson, the only large Ukrainian city captured intact
General Zusko led the 58th Combined Arms Army, which advanced from Crimea on February 24, 2022, and captured the city of Kherson on March 2, 2022, with the loss of less than 300 soldiers. It is widely believed that Russian-aligned collaborators in Crimea and Kherson helped set conditions for the nearly uncontested advance. Zusko's forces were able to reach the outskirts of the city of Mykolaiv and the administrative border of Dnipropetrovsk, where Ukrainian forces stopped them. Zusko was rumored to have been arrested on March 31, 2022, due to failure of command despite his battlefield success and being the only Russian commander who captured a major Ukrainian city and the oblast capital intact. It was verified in June 2022 that Zusko was arrested for failing to capture Mykolaiv and was accused of providing Ukrainian military leaders with information on Russian positions.
Colonel General Gennady Zhidko and Colonel General Alexander Lapin
Accomplishments: The capture of the Luhansk Oblast, including Severodonetsk and Lysychansk
The story of General Zhidko and General Lapin is intertwined with the shortest command of Russian forces in Ukraine, which General of the Army Alexsander Dvornikov led.
On April 10, 2022, General Dvornikov was named the first commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine, with the Kremlin unifying their command structure after the Russian defeats at Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv. He reportedly lasted 17 days in the role and was removed from command due to his extreme drinking problem. Dvornikov is known as the "Butcher of Syria" and was infamous for his scorched earth doctrine, which was employed in the Luhansk Oblast campaign. After vanishing from the public eye in May, Dvornikov was replaced by General Zhidko, who reportedly took over the campaign in Luhansk around May 10 but not officially until early June.
Dvornikov implemented a ruthless campaign, firing up to 80,000 artillery shells, mortars, Grad, and Smerch rockets a day on Ukrainian defensive lines. Working with PMC Wagner mercenaries, the campaign left Popasna, Severodonetsk, and Rubizhne in complete ruin. On July 3, 2022, The Russian Ministry of Defense declared that the Luhansk Oblast had been completely captured after the Ukrainian defense of Lysychansk collapsed. Pedantically, Russian forces never took full administrative control of Bilohorivka or Zolotarivka. This became a rallying cry for members of the Russian 2nd Army Corps of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic, with members repeatedly rioting in July and August when they were sent to the so-called Donetsk People's Republic to fight. The soldiers would ask why they were fighting for Donetsk when the full capture of two towns in Luhansk had not been completed.
Despite leading the capture of Luhansk, Zhidko was demoted in July and named the commander of the Eastern Military District. On August 16, 2023, General Zhidko died after a "long illness."
Colonel General Alexander Lapin was named the commander of Army Group Center in June 2022, and supporting Zhidko shared the credit for the Russian capture of Luhansk. He was awarded Hero of the Russian Federation after the capture of the oblast. After the successful Ukrainian Kharkiv Counteroffensive, a public relations campaign by Private Military Company leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and Colonel General Ramzan Kadyrov targeted Lapin, accusing him of failure to carry out his duty and cowardice. Kadyrov claimed that Lapin never visited the frontlines, which was false. Lapin was removed as commander of the Central Military District in October, and it was officially announced on October 29, 2022. On January 10, 2023, he was assigned as the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces.
General of the Army Sergey Surovikin
Accomplishments: Successful retrograde operation from western Kherson, building the defensive structures in occupied Crimea, Kherson, Zaporzhzhia, and southern Donetsk, instilling basic discipline into Russian troops
General Surovikin was named the commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine on October 8, 2022, the same day Ukraine blew up the Kerch (Crimean) Bridge. Two days later, Ukraine requested a total communications blackout in Kherson, and the second phase of the Kherson Counteroffensive started 48 hours later. Surovkin was handed a complete mess. Reportedly, he negotiated with Putin, Shoigu, and Gerasimov to withdraw Russian forces, which were in a technical encirclement on the right (west) bank of the Dnipro River, in exchange for another Russian victory, likely at Bakhmut, before December 31, 2022.
Surovikin executed a masterful retrograde operation out of Kherson, preserving up to 25,000 Russian troops and their equipment, which slipped across the Dnipro River over a 48 to 72-hour period in November, suffering less than 500 casualties.
While named the commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine, Surovikin kept his "day job" as Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), which included air defense. On December 5, 2022, the Engel-2 Military Airfield was attacked by Ukrainian drones, damaging two Tu-95 strategic bombers and killing up to six Russian servicemembers. On December 26, the airbase was attacked a second time. Surovikin's solution was to relocate Russian strategic bomber resources further east and north.
The other contribution that Surovikin brought was partially ending the policy of sending mobiks with no training to the frontline and instilling military discipline among the Russian troops in Ukraine. This was accomplished by brutally enforcing existing military rules and protocols and creating "busy work" to build the Surovikin Line. A series of defenses with up to three echelons across occupied Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and southwestern Donetsk. The static defenses have stymied Ukraine's summer offensive. His policies and rules were not dismantled and are reflected in a significant improvement in Russian battlefield tactics compared to 2022.
Surovikin did not concentrate the force of 25,000 Russian troops that retreated from Kherson in one area, such as Marinka, Avdiivka, or Bakhmut. Instead, he spread them across several axes. Offensives on Soledar and Bakhmut culminated on December 5 in failure and entered a pause on December 27. Surovikin could not deliver a Russian New Year's victory and was reportedly under pressure to do so. On January 11, 2023, he was relieved of command and named a Deputy of Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov. The next day, PMC Wagner claimed they had captured Soledar - with the true capture date closer to January 21.
Surovikin's affiliation with PMC Wagner was well known, and one of the possible reasons for his demotion was the assignment of known Wagner Group loyalists within his command. The relationship between the Kremlin and Prigozhin was already souring by October 2022. In May 2023, when Priogzhin threatened to leave Bakhmut by May 10, it was widely believed that Surovikin was warning the PMC Wagner leader that the Kremlin was actively working against him and his company.
During the failed Prigozhin Insurrection on June 23, 2023, Surovikin made a video appeal to Prigozhin to stop his actions while holding a submachine on his knee. Shortly after, Surovikin was arrested, reportedly briefly held at Lefotovo Prison, before being transferred to an apartment where he remains under house arrest. On August 22, 2023, he was dismissed as the commander of the Russian VKS, and his future is unclear.
Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmytry Utkin
Accomplishments: The capture of Popasna, Soledar, and Bakhmut and proved Russian penal units could be useful in battle
Private Military Company Wagner Group was asked to support the expansion of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine in March 2022, and up to 1,000 mercenaries arrived on March 19. Wagner Group was engaged in fighting in the Hirske-Zolote region. It was a key fighting force in the capture of Popasna and the Russian advance that ultimately severed the T-513 Highway Ukrainian ground live on communication between Lysychansk-Severodonetsk and Bakhmut in early June 2022.
In May 2022, Wagner Group joined Russian forces, which started an advance in the direction of Bakhmut from Svitlodarsk Bulge. In June 2022, Prigozhin convinced Russian President Vladimir Putin to do a test of creating a battalion of penal soldiers. One thousand convicts were recruited from Russian prisons and deployed east of Bakhmut in late June. The initial group suffered catastrophic losses of up to 90% killed and wounded, but the Kremlin believed the program was successful. Project K was born, and Prigozhin was given open access to Russia's 325,000-plus prisoners. From July to December 2022, 49,000 criminals were recruited into the ranks of PMC Wagner. The Council of Commanders reported that from March 2022 to May 2023, casualty rates were 82.5%. Recruiting peaked in October, but as word of poor training, heavy losses, and no medical care for the wounded spread in Russian penal colonies, numbers dropped sharply.
Prigozhin's September 2022 war of words against General Lapin was costly. The crumbs of goodwill between him and Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu evaporated. That rapidly devolved into a social media campaign against Shoigu and Gerasimov, initially backed by General Kadyrov, to remove the pair. In January 2023, PMC Wagner was cut off from recruiting from Russian penal colonies. The company faced a recruiting crisis among its regular ranks because the pool they would normally recruit from - Russian soldiers - were dying at an alarming rate, didn't want to return to Ukraine, and were facing stop-loss orders from the Kremlin, which was extending their service contracts. In January 2023, it was announced that Shoigu was creating his own PMC, Storm-Z.
Prigozhin infamously threatened to leave Bakhmut in February 2023 when he made his "Shoigu! Gerasimov!" video. He accused the Russian Ministry of Defense of stopping ammunition shipments to his company. The stalemate appeared to break in late February, and supplies normalized. At the same time, Western analysts were advising Ukraine to abandon its defense of Bakhmut.
On May 5, 2023, he made an identical accusation, claiming he had information that the Kremlin had cut off his ammunition supplies and that elite Russian forces who were supposed to defend his flanks in Bakhmut were doing nothing. It is widely believed that General Mizintsev, who had full access to Russian logistics, shared with Prigozhin the depth of work going on behind the scenes to dismantle his company. It is important to note that unlike in February 2023, when there was a noticeable decrease in Russian artillery fire, there was no such decrease in May. The real problem Prigozhin faced was that he was cut off from recruiting from his main pool of mercenaries, and thousands within his ranks were reaching the end of their six-month contracts.
General Kadyrov, who had called Prigozhin "his good friend" days earlier and said that surprises were in store, lashed out at Prigozhin, questioning his loyalty to Russia. Kadyrov reportedly reached an agreement to take over the offensive in Bakhmut, with the Kremlin refusing to accept his offer.
On May 8, Prigozhin announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense told him that if his forces left on May 10, he and his mercenaries would be arrested for treason. He then announced he would stay until Bakhmut was captured. PMC Wagner controlled 93% to 95% of the city at the time. On May 20, Prigozhin announced "mission accomplished," but like in Luhansk, the victory claim was dubious. There has never been a picture of Russian troops in the Litak region of Bakhmut, the last Ukrainian stronghold in the southwest corner, and very few pictures and videos from Russian state media west of the railroad tracks that split the city.
On June 1, Wagner started its withdrawal, and on June 10, the city was handed over to Russian forces. The Kremlin announced that all Private Military Companies would no longer be commanded independently and would have to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense by June 20, accepting to be under the command of the Russian Federation Armed Forces on July 1. At the time, more than a dozen PMCs had popped up, and the mandate also impacted General Kadyrov, whose forces operated independently of the Kremlin.
Prigozhin refused, and it was clear to our analyst team that a clash between PMC Wagner and the Kremlin was inevitable. PMC Wagner claimed their camps were attacked by Russia on June 22, which appears to have been a dubious claim. On June 23, Prigozhin and Wagner founder Dmitry Utkin led an insurrection specifically targeting Shoigu and Gerasimov while pledging their loyalty to President Putin.
Wagner mercenaries essentially captured Rostov-on-Don, barely firing a shot, while Utkin led a convoy of up to a brigade in size over 700 kilometers toward Moscow. The so-called "March for Freedom" ended as quickly as it started. In the end, 15 to 22 Russian soldiers were dead. Seven helicopters and an Il-22M command and control plane were shot down. Part of a refinery was in flames, one highway bridge was destroyed, and at least six civilians were killed when the Russian VKS started to bomb Russian highways indiscriminately.
President Putin initially called the insurrection treason and promised swift justice. Just 48 hours later, it was announced that Prigozhin would not face criminal charges, and two days later, Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko announced he had created a peace deal between himself, Prigozhin, and Putin. PMC Wagner would relocate to Belarus, where Prigozhin would live in exile. Our analyst team never believed this was a firm deal and warned that anyone disloyal to Vladimir Putin had ended up imprisoned, dead, or hiding after surviving an assassination attempt. There were no exceptions to this.
In July, a camp to accommodate up to 8,500 Wagner mercenaries and a second facility to accommodate up to 1,000 were built. On July 15, Prigozhin posted a selfie showing himself in his underwear at the Belarus encampment. Our team noted that being thrown out of a tent would not result in a fatal fall. On July 19, a video was released of him and Utkin addressing a group of Wagnerites about the organization's future.
But under the surface, the claims that 25,000 Wagner mercenaries would occupy Belarus to supplement their army fell apart. By mid-August, it was clear that if there was a three-way deal, it fell apart. Wagner mercenaries had started leaving Belarus in early August, either due to deployments in Libya, recruitment efforts by other PMCs, or because they were unpaid. All recruiting was suspended on July 30, with Prigozhin claiming they had "plenty" of mercenaries in their ranks.
Prigozhin also stunned analysts and his detractors when he appeared in St. Petersburg, Russia, on July 28 at the Russia-African Summit. The sting of the non-response from the Kremlin over the dead Russian airman was barely a month old, and some publicly wondered how Prigozhin, who was supposedly exiled, could be walking around in St. Petersburg as a free man.
On August 23, just hours after General Surovikin was formerly dismissed as the commander of the Russian VKS, Prigozhin's Embraer Legacy 600 private jet was apparently shot down over the Tver region of Russia, while it was en route from Moscow to St. Petersburg. It is reported that Prigozhin, who carefully guarded his travel plans, decided at the last minute not to swap to the second private jet owned by PMC Wagner, an Embraer Legacy 650, that was also bound for St. Petersburg, despite being on the official passenger manifest.
Ten people were killed, including the pilot, co-pilot, and a flight attendant operating on a one-day contract. It is reported she took the job because she needed to travel to St. Petersburg. Among the seven members of PMC Wagner that were killed,
- Yevgeny Prigozhin - figurehead and leader focusing on media, social media, psychological operations, and commercial catering
- Dmitry Utkin - creator of the name "Wagner," known white nationalist, and the military leader of PMC Wagner
- Valery Chekalov - Head of logistics operating under the title of "business advisor"
- Alexander Totmin - Not much is known about him, but it is reported he was the equivalent of a senior field officer for Wagner Group in Sudan
Three other PMC Wagner mercenaries who were bodyguards were also killed.
In Putin's Russia, battlefield success is hazardous to your health, stature, and freedom.
Comments
AR
Thank you for putting an incredibly complex and confusing series of events into an understandable logical narrative. This is the second reason I love malcontent so much. You do such a fantastic job of analyzing and assessing the information available. My first reason to love malcontent is because the truth matters. I have not been disappointed to date. Thank you David, and thanks to your team for the outstanding work. Other news agencies clearly have a lot to learn from you folks.
I love when you release analysis on a massive amount of information in a nice coherent condensed report. Probably even more than the SitReps. Well done!
