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Analysis 30 AUG 2023 - 11:30 PDT - Breach at Verbove; What's Been Learned?
🕑 Added 2023-08-30 18:52:13 +0000 UTCThe War Map has been updated from the hasty change made overnight after we geolocated the video showing members of the Ukrainian 82nd Brigade 250 meters from the first homes in Verbove and past the second echelon of the Surovikin Line.
The Ukrainian offensive is accelerating due to a change in tactics.
Kyiv appears to have decided that it is going to concentrate its combat potential in three places. First, around Kupyansk and, to a lesser extent, Svatove and Kreminna. This grouping is meant as a deterrent force and not for active offensive operations. Second, at Bakhmut. Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Maliar stated that this is a main area of focus for the ongoing summer counteroffensive. And finally, in the Melitopol-Berdyansk direction at Orikhiv. Ukrainian offensive operations south of Velkya Novosilka appear to have been deprioritized.
Ukrainian forces have breached the deep minefields over a 13-kilometer gap, which is widening.
The minefields Russia built south of Orikhiv were some of the densest in history and, in some places, were 7 to 9 kilometers deep. Ukraine was provided an inadequate amount of equipment to breach minefields that complex, but in defense of Western aid. It's questionable whether there was enough equipment available in the West's strategic reserves. Now that the worst is over, Ukrainian forces are able to maneuver, and movement on the battlefield is life. We had correctly assessed that Ukraine's ability to map the minefields using thermal imaging during the hottest days of summer would provide an advantage, and it did.
We're starting to see the reported flaws of the Surovikin Line.
In April, Russian state media toured the Surovikin Line, and as Ukrainian forces have been driving deeper, Russian propaganda is resurfacing the videos of tunnel networks, living quarters, and deep bunkers. If you've seen the videos, they are quite impressive.
Among the people touring were a number of Russian milbloggers who are current or former military and some area commanders with the so-called Donetsk People's Republic. They were not impressed. We shared this in a Situation Report and what flaws they reported.
- The approaches to the dragon teeth weren't mined. Russian officials told the press that mines would be added. If they meant they would be part of the first echelon, they told the truth. If they meant added after final construction, at least at Verbove, that didn't happen.
- The dragon teeth aren't cabled together, and there is no razor/barbed wire. This was another feature that Russian officials said would be added. In some areas, there is razor wire, but again, not at Verbove. This is why the light infantry of the 82nd Brigade was able to walk through.
- The dirt from the antitank ditches was used to create berms as the next obstacle, but they blocked the view from the trench network. Defenders won't know where a breach is until the opposing force is at the top of the berms and already has superior firing positions. This problem isn't everywhere but was noted in place.
- The bunkers had inadequately thick roofs made of logs and soil that, in the estimation of people from the military, would be breached by anything larger than 82 mm. That issue has reportedly been addressed in many areas by adding soil and concrete.
The lack of mines, cables, razor wire, and blocked views enabled the 82nd Brigade to use the national forest to advance to the edge of Verbove. It is important to remember that the main defensive structure was called by one Russian milblogger, the Faberege Line.
The reports that Ukraine was running out of ammunition were inaccurate.
Russian troops are stating that the Ukrainian artillery fire is endless and that Ukrainian forces appear to have "unlimited" ammunition - which isn't true. The journalists and analysts who latched on to the Thug Shaker Central papers to declare that Ukraine would run out of air defense missiles and artillery ammunition aren't talking about how that didn't happen. A lot of focus is given to the United States' rather pathetic production numbers of 155 mm artillery shells while ignoring that multiple European nations have expanded production at a faster pace, and at least three Eastern European nations have dusted off Cold War-era Soviet ammunition factories. Ukraine is also making its own ammunition in partnership with third-party nations and within Ukraine, and the volume is increasing.
Ukraine has achieved artillery parity and, in some places, superiority.
The king is dead! Long live the king! Artillery is still the god of the battlefield. How artillery is most effectively delivered has changed. The towed artillery piece is already being declared "dead" by Western military planners because it takes too much time to set up and remove, making it too vulnerable to modern counterbattery radars and drones. The future is much brighter for the self-propelled howitzer (SPG) and guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS).
NATO-standard artillery pieces have longer range and far greater accuracy than their Soviet-era counterparts. Ukrainian officials declared that the M777 (a towed artillery piece) was the first Western weapon system "fully integrated" into the military. That's military speak, for we are now experts in this system. The Pokemon collection of all of the SPGs Ukraine is operating isn't far behind. That proficiency has led to greater accuracy. While Ukraine may face a deficit of total artillery pieces in an operational area of 3 to 1 or 4 to 1, the improved range and accuracy make up for the difference.
The other problem Russia is facing is worn-out barrels. One analyst estimated Russia is having to remove 200 to 300 artillery pieces a month from the theater of war because the barrels are worn out or have banana peeled. Minor wear can be compensated for by an experienced artillery team. But as the wear gets worse, the rifling in the barrel becomes smooth. The shell wobbles in the air, and that reduces range and accuracy. The solution? Move the artillery piece up closer to the line of conflict, where it is more vulnerable to drone strikes and counterbattery.
Ukraine has the same issue but has better sustainment programs with Western support and has started producing replacement 122 mm and 152 mm barrels for their legacy systems. Russian, for the most part, is just parking worn-out artillery pieces.
Ukraine pounded Verbove with thousands of artillery shells for 72 hours, looking at pictures, videos, and NASA FIRMS information before the 82nd Brigade advances. This brings up the last most critical point. The problem of Ukraine signaling, "We're going to attack here," by hitting an area with artillery and then waiting hours to advance is getting resolved. We are seeing much better coordination between artillery units and ground troops, where advances are following immediately after artillery sets conditions.
Ukraine is close to or has achieved air parity at Orikhiv.
Russia lost another Ka-52 helicopter this morning, and we are seeing a lot more close air support sorties by the Ukrainian Air Force. Ukrainian drones have been hunting down Russian air defenses and radar systems to direct GMLRS strikes, and the destroy enemy air defense operations are starting to pay dividends. Ukrainian drone operators have also changed tactics. Instead of attacking a moving vehicle as a target of opportunity, they are now following it to its destination, which is exposing higher-value targets such as radars, electronic warfare systems, and antiaircraft batteries. It won't be long until Russia adopts this tactic, so in the game of swords and shields, Ukraine will have to start thinking about improving its own countermeasures.
Grunts with guns take territory. Grunts with guns hold territory. Russia has a grunts with guns problem - again.
We've been noting for weeks that an increasing number of Russian units are becoming combat ineffective or combat destroyed. This has forced Russian commanders to move their airborne (VDV) and naval infantry forces, meant for future offensive operations or to be a quick response force, into defensive roles. If Russia hadn't sent the 810th Naval Infantry to Orikhiv, they would be pushing Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Dnipro River. These units would also have been preserved to be used for attacks when Ukraine's offensive culminates, and it will culminate. Russia has been pushing its reserve units in an attempt to wear down Ukrainian forces theaterwide. It has created extremely heavy casualties for Ukraine, probably on parity to June 2022. However, artillery is still the god of the battlefield, and unlike June 2022, Ukraine has parity. Additionally, Russia had exhausted many of its units during its failed winter offensive. Yes, they captured Bakhmut, and the quasi-army group of 49,000 mercenaries from PMC Wagner does not exist. Russia has a grunts with guns problem, and we saw that in Verbove. Ukrainian forces shouldn't have been able to essentially walk through the Surovikin Line, but that's exactly what they did. Where were the Russian soldiers at the second echelon? We have repeatedly assessed that the big question is how many forces are behind the wall. At Verbove, the answer so far is "not enough."
Winter is not coming.
You're probably reading in the press, "Ukraine is running out of time before winter comes." The Kherson counteroffensive ended in mid-November, and the fall mud season is milder because there isn't snow melt on top of the rain. Memories among analysts and reporters also appear to be short because Russia expanded its war of aggression on February 24, 2022, and rapidly moved across Zaporzhzhia and Kherson without issue because these areas are warmer and drier than the Donbas and the interior of Ukraine. Is weather a wild card? Yes. Could mud become an issue? Yes. But the Ukrainian offensive will almost certainly culminate before "winter comes."
This won't be easy.
Now that we've shared the reasons why the Ukrainian offensive at Orikhiv is accelerating let's set some expectations.
We've read the New York Times piece about casualties, but if you read the Situation Reports, you already know that Ukrainian casualties are very high. It is very unlikely Ukraine is losing three to four brigades of soldiers a month for the last four months, as the New York Times suggested, because the Ukrainian offensives would have already culminated theaterwide.
So, how did you already know that Ukrainian casualties are high? Because Ukrainian President Voldoymyr Zelenskyy said they were, and many in the Western press missed it. While visiting a field hospital near Orikhiv earlier in the month, President Zelenskyy said that at that one stabilization station, up to 250 Ukrainian soldiers are arriving each day. That's one station in one operational area. Two days earlier, a doctor in Dnipro said they were seeing 50 to 100 new patients a day. That's one hospital. This was in the Situation Reports.
Ukrainian forces are paying for their own land with their blood, and the losses are high. We won't speculate on total casualty numbers for Russia or Ukraine because it is impossible to determine, and we will reiterate anyone who says "casualty numbers are X" doesn't know what they are talking about. That includes Western intelligence agencies.
Russia will minimize (OK, completely deny) its own losses while exaggerating Ukrainian losses.
Ukraine will minimize its losses while exaggerating Russian losses.
That's called war, and every nation since the invention of the printing press has done it.
Even if the second and third echelons of the Surovikin Line do prove to be the Faberge Line, as one Russian milblogger called it, thousands of Ukrainian men and women who had hopes and dreams will die to take back their land.
This could be mitigated if the West would stop being so afraid of "making Putin mad."
We maintain that no one should be expecting a Kharkiv-style breakthrough.
Second to last thought. On August 30, 1944, German forces that had stalled the Allied advance at Normandy started their withdrawal. Ukraine's offensive at Orikhiv started on June 4, two days before the D-Day Invasion at Normandy.
Closing thought about the reports that some Western planners want Ukraine to go "all in" at Orikhiv with everything they have. Operation Market Garden, launched in September 1944, was meant as an "all-in" offensive to capture key bridges between the Netherlands and Germany to end World War II "by Christmas." There are a lot of reasons why Market Garden failed, and the days of dropping thousands of paratroopers into contested airspace behind enemy lines are almost certainly over. Capturing the bridges into Germany almost certainly would not have brought victory by Christmas. Ukraine reaching the Sea of Azov by Christmas won't end the Russia-Ukraine War either.
Comments
This war probably won’t be over for at least 2 year’s minimum. But could be 4-6 more years easily. The West will have to continue to do more. The long war favors Ukraine.
Who will be doing the audio for the upcoming re-birth of the Spotify podcast?
