Russia-Ukraine SITREP for 01 SEP 2023 23:59* - The Accelerating Offensive at Orikhiv

My guess is that the Kremlin has effectively prolonged their war by “silencing” anyone who would criticize the Russian army’s losses and make the truth about them public. The “angry patriots” and also Prigozhin could have stoked up a lot of dissent in the army by blaming losses on the leadership.

Completely agree. We were hopeful that things would be progressing faster, but we never expected and were warned not to expect a "knockout" punch like at Kharkiv. Around July 20, when everything appeared to have stalled out, and the Ukrainian 10th Corps got deployed, we were doing a lot of internal analysis - was the outside doom justified? It wasn't about the slow pace. It was more due to some of the mistakes made - mostly at a platoon and company level where it was clear some commanders were still clinging to Soviet tactics. For us, it wasn't NATO training better. We had also expressed concern from Ukrainian reports of NATO training focusing on urban warfare, dismissing drones, and teaching nothing about trench warfare. That isn't to say the training was useless. But it wasn't aligned with reality. It is reported that programs are changing and better coordinated. The 93rd (Gods of War) will show if that's true or not. This was more of an issue of terribly executed attacks where very basic mistakes were made. It is very clear that Ukraine shifted tactics a second time at the end of July, and this hybridized NATO-post-Soviet blend they're using is working very well. Our view remains unchanged that Russia will continue to send troops even if it means arming them with pitchforks and having them wear burlap sack uniforms. Someone in my personal circle said to me that I seemed more "upbeat" on Ukraine's prospects. I am, and the biggest thing is related to the long game. When the Thug Shaker Central leaks came out, Russians laughed, and some "experts" howled Ukraine was running out of tank, artillery, and HIMARS ammunition with no fix and would be out of air defense munitions by early June. That Western and allied production couldn't match consumption no matter what, and there was no way to solve this. It's September. It was untrue. The "experts" underestimated other nations' capabilities outside of the United States and ignored Ukraine's partnership to restart or build new ammunition factories and Ukraine's own efforts. Ukraine's ability to innovate, test, and scale new military solutions will be studied for decades to come. It is very clear now that there is no "I'll be home for Christmas," and this war will go on for many more months. This won't be easy. But I am feeling more upbeat. More cracks are forming south of Orikhiv, and if Ukraine can gain more than a toehold on the railroad grade south of Bakhmut, things will start to move faster in that AO.

Exactly this! The Long game favors Ukraine. Russia dig into its old equipment reserves for so long before its going to have to rely mainly on new production. Maybe that happens in 2026 or 2025, but at the rate Ukraine is improving it’s long range fires and ammo production that timeline could arrive sooner than expected. Neither side will run out of troops, but they might run out of heavy equipment eventually.

Isn't it true that whichever military strategy Ukraine had chosen, they'd still eventually have to face a large number of Russian troops and hardware (and air power). Tactical advantages can be significant but there are always trade-offs. For example advancing battalions which break through enemy lines can be very vulnerable to attacks on their flanks and from artillery and air -- especially in flat terrains where there are few towns and natural barriers and no time to "dig in" for defence. There is no "knockout punch" where the Russian Army admits defeat and withdraws because they've been out-manoeuvred. They're always going to re-direct units and resources to where they're most needed. The Russian army is prepared to take huge losses and their numeric and hardware superiority can't just be bypassed with just a single clever strategy. And so Ukraine's strategy of patiently wearing down Russian capabilities, taking the fight to the Russians but on their own terms, where they can take advantage of their superior western supplied artillery and their new drone units, seems eminently sensible. And also the increased ability to strike inside Russia is (I'm convinced) very effective at putting political pressure on Russian leadership as well as impacting them militarily and economically. Ukraine always had to play the long-game with the hand that they've been dealt (excuse the mixed metaphor!)