TheMalcontent
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Venezuela-Guyana, Israel-Hamas, Russia-Ukraine Flash Report 16 DEC 23 16:15 PST
🕑 Added 2023-12-17 00:49:04 +0000 UTCVenezuela-Guyana Crisis
The Venezuela-Guyana Crisis appears to have reached a partial resolution, with both nations agreeing to non-aggression and to respect the 1966 Geneva Agreement. UNASUR and CARICOM likely played a significant role in deconfliction. It is unclear (and it's a Saturday, so I'm not looking) if Venezuela will honor the International Court of Justice as the arbiter, as outlined by the 1966 UN agreement, or if the two nations will negotiate independently. No, I don't think Venezuela is buying time or is negotiating in bad faith. Caracas needs access to global oil markets, and they need U.S. support for that. Brazil also sent a strong signal the nation might take action if Venezuela choose violence.
Israel-Hamas War
This is a short list of hot takes versus deep analysis, but they're rooted in the obvious.
The situation with the Houthi rebels in the Red Sea is well past a tipping point. Five nations have a military presence now, including China. The growing list of shippers that will no longer transit the Suez Canal to avoid the Red Sea ironically hurts Egypt. Over 17% of all tax revenue collected comes from transit fees. Eventually, civilian sailors are going to die, there is going to be an ecological disaster, or a warship is going to get hit. Hot take: it's well past the time to hit back, and I hope that Egypt is screaming through back channels to solve this issue. This is past attempts to attack Israel and Israeli interests by proxy. This is IRGC-backed rebels previously part of Al Qaeda, partially responsible for the deaths of over 400,000 people in a bloody civil war, lighting fires.
Israel executed an air strike deep into Lebanon, the first one since 2006. Tel Aviv has signaled they would do it if Hezbollah didn't withdraw from the border. I am not sure what the response will be. The Lebanese government is growing weary of Hezbollah launching harassing attacks along the UN-established border (the Lebanese government has no control over IRGC-backed Hezbollah). There is credible intelligence that some leaders within Hezbollah are questioning the ongoing tactics. They're not going to launch a full-scale attack on Israel; it is grinding down ammunition and equipment, and if the operational goal was to lock IDF forces in place so they can't be used in the Gaza Strip, it's not working.
About the three hostages killed by the IDF. Tel Aviv has a huge problem, and it is far beyond three dead hostages. This deserves a lot more characters, but briefly. The three hostages emerged shirtless, waving a white flag, hands in the air, 30 to 60 meters away, per the IDF report. Soldiers make mistakes, but this is beyond a mistake. If these were Hamas militants, this would be a naked war crime. This raises huge questions about Israeli tactics—a few points. The IDF is defending the incident, saying that they didn't have a plan or considered hostages escaping and entering the battlefield. Yet in November, the world learned about a hostage who evaded detection for four days trying to get out of the Gaza Strip, only to be captured and returned to Hamas. One of the three, by the IDF account, was wounded and ran for cover. They yelled for help in Hebrew and ultimately were killed by a second soldier. This goes past soldiers who made a mistake in the fog of war or violated the rules of engagement. This suggests there is something more systemic in the command and control (or lack thereof) in the IDF. At best, this indicates a lack of discipline within the ranks that extends to the command staff. The IDF already has a massive credibility problem, and not all of it is deserved due to hybrid warfare. This incident is indefensible, and in the U.S. military, it would likely be career-ending in the chain of command to the brigade level. Applying the same filter from the Russia-Ukraine War - what aren't we seeing?
Russia-Ukraine War
Considering Ukraine's ammunition situation, being able to type "there are no map changes" on a day when there were a number of videos showing large-scale Russian attacks ending in disaster is very good news. One video that required no geolocation (so many videos now from around Krasnohorivka on the north flank I'm at the point of, oh, that's Stepove, or north of the Coke Plant, or the railroad grade or...) showed a familiar scene. A full company of Russian mechanized infantry with dismounts advancing from Krasnohorivka in a column. Seven of 15 vehicles were destroyed before they even reached the forwardmost line of friendly troops (FLOT). The Russian company was combat destroyed before engaging Ukrainian ground forces. The Russian military is in this bizarre state of showing an increasing ability to learn and adapt on the battlefield in many ways. But not when it comes to combined arms warfare. And this isn't an isolated case that can be pinned to the district commander. We've seen the same disastrous Russian attempts to advance on Krynky in Kherson and Synkivika in Kharkiv. Also, where did the ZALA Lancet one-way drones go?
The question I'm asking myself. Has Putin become directly involved in battlefield decisions again? The signs point to yes, and while everyone is wondering where Navalny is - where is Gerasimov? Or, for that matter, Shoigu. Both have become conspicuously invisible, which is saying something because Gerasimov is already as elusive as a feral cat.
