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Transubstantiation DEFENDED
🕑 Added 2022-02-22 18:35:26 +0000 UTCObjection: It seems that accidents cannot inhere sine subjecto, for, accidents are those beings which inhere in the being of substance (as Grenier calls them, “being of being”), to inhere by Divine power goes against this definition, ERGO…
There are two genera of responses to this objection. First, one may respond by distinguishing the major premise (“accidents are those beings which inhere…”). Second, one may respond by denying the minor premise (“to inhere by Divine power goes against this definition…”).
To the first, it seems as if this merely accounts for the action of an accident (which does not account for a true definition), rather we should seek the quiditas of the thing by accounting for the genus and differentia. As St. Thomas teaches, “The term ‘quiddity,’ surely, is taken from the fact that this is what is signified by the definition” (DeEnte.C1.4), and “the term ‘nature’ used in this way seems to signify the essence of a thing as it is ordered to the proper operation of the thing.” (Ibid.) Now, inherence would be the “proper operation of the thing [accidents].” Therefore, in no way can it be the definition of an accident.
Now, accidents are regarded to be a category of being, as the Philosopher teaches, in the Organon. Yet, it is also a principle of Thomistic philosophy that being is not a genus, as the Philosopher teaches in the Metaphysics. But, this does not hinder us from regarding being as the linguistic subject of predication in a definition and thus said to be the “genus” of definition.
In a similar way, being itself cannot be properly defined, only improperly defined. As Grenier teaches, “Being cannot be defined, because every definition is composed of a genus and a differentia. But there can be no gensu above being; nor can being have a differentia properly so called. Therefore being cannot be defined.” (Cursus Philosophiae 491)
The differentia of an accident ought rather to be defined, as one which does not exist by its own inherent virtue, as St. Thomas teaches, “Since being is not a genus, then being cannot be of itself the essence of either substance or accident. Consequently, the definition of substance is not—a being of itself without a subject, nor is the definition of accident—a being in a subject; but it belongs to the quiddity or essence of substance to have existence not in a subject; while it belongs to the quiddity or essence of accident to have existence in a subject.” (ST.III.Q77.A1.Rep2). This provides for the principle of natural inherence, rather than defining a thing based on its natural act.
From this, the solution is clear. For, being does not exist ipsum, rather being exists ab alio (from another) in ipsum esse (that is, God). As St. Thomas teaches, “Every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun’s nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence.” (ST.I.Q104.A1.C.6)
Thus the tradition has affirmed that being is not an essential predicate of created being, but only of God in whom essence is existence. As Grenier teaches, “An essential predicate is a predicate which designates the essence of the thing of which it is predicated…Being as signifying existence, is not an essential predicate of creatures, because creatures are being by participation…not essentially.” (496.1)
Thus, in accounting for accidents as “being of being,” they are better described as “being existing from Being itself, through the instrumentality of being.” In this, the being of substance is merely the instrumentality (instrumental cause) through which accidents participate in Being itself, rather than an indispensable element. If we were to dispense with substance, accidents would not exist, unless God upheld the participation in His Being, it would transfer from mediate to immediate.
Thus, we can claim Divine power for this miracles. Just as God dispensed with instrumentality in the conception of Our Lord, so also may God dispense with instrumentality in the participation of accidents in His Being. In light of this, the argument of St. Thomas follows that God may dispense with secondary causes.
Second, I deny the minor premise that “to inhere by Divine power goes against this definition…” For, in this definition given by Aristotle, the genus is “being” (note: the qualifications above) and the specific differentia is that of “inherence.” “Inherence” is a certain operation of a thing. It is not essential for a certain operation to terminate in the completion of its act in order for it to be a specific differentia. Rather, as Bl. Scotus argues, it needs only be necessary that the operation be active and be said to “tend towards” completion of the act. Further, to have the faculties for such an operation in potentia also is sufficient to qualify for such a definition.
This will be clear by analogy. The genus of man is that he is an “animal” and the specific differentia is that he is “rational.” Now, rationality refers not to the operation or actualization of the rational faculties, but the possession of the faculties (even in potentia). A man who is in a coma is not said to be “definitionally not a man,” but, rationally exists, 1. In faculties present, 2. In Potentia, and 3. In the inherent tending towards rational actions present within him.
In the same way, while inherence does not reach the terminus of inhereing in a substance, still, 1. The faculties of inherence are present, 2. The accidents inhere in potentia, and 3. Accidents still tend towards inherence.
